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Freedom of Expression and Location:
Are There Constitutional
Dead Zones?
Brian Slattery*

I. INTRODUCTION
Do reporters have the right to conduct interviews in courthouse hallways? May political activists hand out leaflets in shopping centres? Are
journalists entitled to attend disciplinary hearings in the chambers of the
law society? Do advertisers have the right to place ads on public buses?
These questions have one thing in common: they all concern the exercise of freedom of expression in certain locations — courthouses,
shopping centres, private offices, buses. But do all locations without exception benefit from the guarantee of freedom of expression in section
2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 or do some fall
beyond its scope?
The Supreme Court first dealt with this issue in the Commonwealth
case2 in 1991, where it split into three distinct camps, each supporting a
different approach. This split remained unresolved until the Montréal
case3 in 2005, where the Court endorsed the view that certain places —
such as private government offices — are categorically excluded from
section 2(b) because of their historical or actual function. However, the
Court advanced this view only tentatively, in an explicit obiter dictum
that played no actual role in the decision. So it is a matter of interest that

*

Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c.11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Section 2(b) provides: “Everyone has the following fundamental
freedoms: ... (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press
and other media of communication; ...”.
2
Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1991] S.C.J. No. 3, [1991] 1
S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Commonwealth”].
3
Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Montréal”].
1
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in the recent Vancouver case,4 the Supreme Court has thrown caution to
the winds and formally endorsed the Montréal approach.
I believe the Court has taken a wrong turn on this point, one that
leads down a blind alley. My task is to show why and to point a way out.
I start with the Irwin Toy case,5 which establishes the basic analytical
framework for section 2(b). I then review the line of cases in which the
Supreme Court specifically addresses the question of location, culminating in the Vancouver decision.6 I conclude with a critique of these cases
and a suggested solution.7

II. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
According to Irwin Toy,8 when there is a claim that freedom of expression has been infringed, a court follows a three-stage process. At the
first stage, the court inquires whether the claimant’s activity qualifies as
expression under section 2(b). If the answer is affirmative, the court
moves to the second stage where it considers whether the impugned governmental act can actually be said to infringe the right. If an infringement
is found to exist, the court moves to the third and final stage where it
asks whether the infringement can be justified under section 1 of the
Charter, which allows for reasonable limits on Charter rights.9
In dealing with the first stage, the Supreme Court distinguishes between the content and the form of the activity. In relation to content, the
Court observes that freedom of expression was entrenched in the Constitution so as to ensure that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions
and beliefs, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream. In a free, pluralistic and democratic society, we prize a diversity
4
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students – British Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Vancouver”].
5
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Québec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”].
6
Supra, note 4.
7
For valuable background, see B. Jamie Cameron, “A Bumpy Landing: The Supreme
Court of Canada and Access to Public Airports Under Section 2(b) of the Charter” (1992) 2 Media
& Communications L. Rev. 91; Richard Moon, “Access to Public and Private Property Under Freedom of Expression” (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 339; and Richard Moon, “Freedom of Expression and
Property Rights” (1988) 52 Sask. L. Rev. 243.
8
Supra, note 5. The majority opinion was jointly authored by Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer
and Wilson JJ. The following account draws on paras. 40-53.
9
Section 1 provides: “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
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of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and
to the individual. In the words of Rand J., freedom of expression is “little
less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is to his physical existence”.10
In light of this fact, the Court concludes that we cannot exclude human activity from the scope of guaranteed free expression on the basis of
the content or meaning being conveyed. If the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima facie
falls within the scope of the guarantee. The Court notes that some human
activity is purely physical and does not convey or attempt to convey a
meaning. It might be difficult to characterize certain mundane tasks, like
parking a car, as having expressive content. However, if the claimant can
show that such an activity is performed to convey a meaning, it would
fall within the protected sphere.
For example, an unmarried person might, as part of a public protest,
park in a zone reserved for spouses of government employees in order
to express dissatisfaction or outrage at the chosen method of allocating
a limited resource. If that person could demonstrate that his activity did
in fact have expressive content, he would, at this stage, be within the
11
protected sphere and the s. 2(b) challenge would proceed.

This example is interesting because it relates to a location (a zone in
a parking lot) that is closed to the general public and reserved specifically for the spouses of government employees. Significantly, the Court
treats the application of section 2(b) here as unproblematic so long as the
activity has expressive content.
The Court goes on to discuss the requisite form of expressive acts.
Here again it adopts a generous approach, holding that expressive content can be conveyed through an infinite variety of forms, such as the
written or spoken word, the arts, and even physical gestures or acts. The
only activities excluded are those that take the form of violence; clearly
murderers and rapists cannot invoke freedom of expression to justify
their acts.
The Court now turns to the second stage of the inquiry, which deals
with the question of infringement. It holds that a governmental act infringes freedom of expression if it restricts a claimant’s attempt to convey
meaning in either purpose or effect, with either mode being sufficient.

10
11

Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 306 (S.C.C.).
Irwin Toy, supra, note 5, at para. 41.
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In relation to purpose, the Court says that a governmental act infringes section 2(b) if it singles out particular meanings that are not to be
conveyed or restricts a form of expression in order to control the audience’s access to the meaning being conveyed or the speaker’s ability to
convey it. On the other hand, where the government aims to control only
the physical consequences of certain human activity, regardless of the
meaning being conveyed, its purpose is not to control expression. So, for
example, a rule against handing out pamphlets restricts a particular form
of expression (pamphlets) and so infringes section 2(b). By contrast, an
anti-littering law only aims to control the physical consequences of certain conduct regardless of its meaning and so does not infringe the
section in purpose.
However, even if the purpose of the governmental act passes muster,
the act may still have an invalid effect. Here, says the Court, claimants
must show that their activity promotes at least one of the basic values
underlying freedom of expression, namely: (1) seeking and attaining the
truth; (2) participating in social and political decision-making; and (3)
individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing. For example, where
demonstrators contend that an anti-noise by-law has the effect of limiting
their freedom of expression by preventing them from shouting slogans,
they must prove that their activity attempts to convey a meaning that reflects one of these values.
It may be seen that the Court’s infringement test can be readily satisfied in most cases. Even where the governmental act does not aim to
restrict expression, claimants will normally be able to show it has that
effect. Indeed it is not easy to imagine situations where the latter would
not hold true — not, at least, without resorting to unusual examples, such
as shouting for shouting’s sake (but then, people usually shout for some
purpose).
In summary, for an activity to qualify as “expressive” at the first
stage, a claimant need only show that it attempts to convey a meaning in
a non-violent way. For a governmental act to infringe the right at the second stage, it need only restrict it in purpose or effect. Since these hurdles
are relatively low, in most cases the inquiry moves to the final stage,
where the court considers whether the infringement may be justified under section 1. Here a court applies the test laid down in the Oakes case12
and considers the full range of factors bearing on both the governmental
act and the expressive activity, balancing one off against the other.
12

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”].
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One feature of this scheme has a special relevance for our inquiry —
and we will briefly note it here, postponing full discussion until later. The
first stage of the Irwin Toy analysis focuses entirely on the expressive
activity to the exclusion of the law or governmental act that allegedly
infringes it. That is, the question whether an activity falls within the
scope of section 2(b) depends entirely on the character of the activity —
its content and form — and not at all on the character of the impugned
restrictive law. An activity that fails to gain the protection of section 2(b)
— such as a violent assault — is excluded because of its inherent attributes. The character of the restrictive law does not affect the matter one
way or the other. It is only at the second and third stages of the inquiry
that the court turns its attention to the law or act allegedly infringing the
right.

III. THE QUESTION OF LOCATION: THREE VIEWS
At which stage in the Irwin Toy analysis does the question of location
arise? The answer is not immediately clear; something may be said for
each of the three stages.
The question arose in the Commonwealth case.13 The claimants, who
were officers of a fringe political group, undertook promotion and recruitment activities at Montréal International Airport.14 The Airport was
Crown property and governed by regulations issued under federal legislation. Armed with placards, leaflets and magazines, the claimants
walked through the departure area of the airport terminal — an area open
to the public. They approached passers-by, informing them about the
goals of the group and soliciting members, but they did not attempt to
hold meetings, make speeches or use loudspeakers. A police officer
asked them to stop. When they objected, they were taken to the assistant
manager of the airport, who told them that regulations prohibited any
business, undertaking, advertising or solicitation in the airport without
ministerial authorization.
The claimants brought an action seeking a declaration, inter alia, that
the federal government had not respected their freedom of expression
under section 2(b), arguing that the open areas of the airport constituted a
13

Supra, note 2.
The following account of the facts draws on Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at paras. 26,
50-52, supplemented by Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada, [1986] F.C.J. No.
1036, [1985] 2 F.C. 3, at paras. 1-4 (F.C.T.D.).
14
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public forum where this freedom could be exercised. They were successful at trial and the Crown appealed. When the case reached the Supreme
Court of Canada, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the claimants’ right to use the public areas of the airport for expressive purposes,
with all judges agreeing that freedom of expression had been infringed
and that the infringement could not be justified under section 1. However, in reasoning to this conclusion, the Court split into three factions,
headed respectively by Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, Justice Beverley
McLachlin and Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé.15 Each judge championed a different stage of the Irwin Toy analysis as the appropriate venue
for discussing the issue of location: one arguing that it went to the question of section 2(b)’s scope, another that it concerned the section’s
infringement, and the third that it was a matter of reasonable limits under
section 1. Their views merit detailed attention.
1. Location and Scope
In his opinion, Lamer C.J.C. argues that the question of expression
on public property arises primarily at the first stage of the Irwin Toy
analysis, where the court determines whether the expressive activity falls
within the scope of section 2(b).16 He observes that the freedom of an
individual to communicate in a place owned by the government must
necessarily be circumscribed by the interests of the government and the
citizenry as a whole. The individual will only be free to communicate in
a place owned by the state if the form of expression is compatible with
the principal function or intended purpose of the place. The form of expression cannot have the effect of depriving citizens of the effective
operation of government services and undertakings.
For example, says the Chief Justice, no one would suggest that an
individual is free to shout a political message in the Library of Parliament. This form of expression is incompatible with the basic purpose of
the place, which requires silence. When individuals communicate in a
public place, they must consider the function of the place and adjust their
means of communication accordingly. By contrast, wearing a T-shirt

15

Justice Sopinka concurs with Lamer C.J.C., and Cory J. also expresses agreement with
this basic approach (at para. 212). Justice Gonthier agrees with the approach of McLachlin J. (at
para. 210). Justice LaForest leaves the question open for future consideration, while tending to favour the approach of McLachlin J. (at paras. 45-46).
16
The following account is based on Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at paras. 1-22.
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emblazoned with a political slogan would likely be consistent with the
library’s purpose.
The Chief Justice observes that the fact that one’s freedom of expression is intrinsically limited by the function of a public place is an
application of the general rule that one’s rights are circumscribed by the
rights of others. It also accords with observations made in the Irwin Toy
case, where the Supreme Court held that certain forms of expression —
notably acts of violence — do not enjoy the protection of section 2(b).
If the expression takes a form that is inconsistent with the function of
the place, it falls outside the sphere of section 2(b). To take another example, says the Chief Justice, if people picketed in the middle of a busy
highway, this form of expression might well be incompatible with the
principal function of the place, which is to provide for the smooth flow
of traffic. In such a case, freedom of expression would not be restricted if
a government representative obliged the picketers to express themselves
elsewhere.
The Chief Justice concludes that it is only when claimants have
proven that their form of expression is compatible with the function of
the place that the requirements of section 2(b) will be satisfied and the
analysis can proceed to section 1. While the state’s main interest is to
ensure the effective operation of its property, that is not its only concern;
there is also, for instance, the objective of maintaining law and order,
which might justify certain limitations on section 2(b). Thus, the chair of
a municipal council would generally be justified in limiting the speaking
time allotted to councillors so as to give everyone a chance to contribute.
Such a concern, says Lamer C.J.C., comes under section 1 of the Charter,
as do many others.
This last example highlights a difficulty with the Chief Justice’s approach. It is not clear how to draw the line between matters that arise
under section 2(b) and those that are deferred to section 1. If one municipal councillor insists on shouting in the council chamber while another
one speaks for hours on end, it is not clear why the former matter arises
at the first stage under section 2(b) (as the Library of Parliament example
suggests), while the latter matter is left for section 1 (as the municipal
council example indicates). Arguably, restrictions on both shouting and
filibustering are equally suited for consideration under section 1.
Indeed, the Chief Justice’s overall approach is somewhat surprising
given his initial observations on the fundamental differences between the
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Constitutions of the United States and Canada.17 The American Bill of
Rights, he observes, contains no clause similar to section 1 of the Charter, which gives governments the opportunity to justify limitations on
constitutional rights. American doctrine on the question of expressive
location results from an attempt to strike a balance between individual
and governmental interests in the absence of a provision equivalent to
section 1. Canadian courts, he concludes, should disregard the “nominalistic” approach taken by American courts in this area and instead balance
the underlying interests directly. It is curious, then, that the Chief Justice
assigns such a limited role to section 1 in carrying out this balancing.
2. Location and Infringement
By contrast, McLachlin J. argues that the question of location arises,
not at the first stage of the Irwin Toy process, but rather at the second
stage where a court decides if the governmental act actually infringes the
claimant’s freedom of expression.18 She begins by observing that freedom of expression does not historically imply freedom to express oneself
wherever one pleases. In other words, freedom of expression does not
automatically comport freedom of forum. For example, it has not historically conferred a right to use another’s private property for expressive
purposes. Proprietors have the right to determine who uses their property
and for what purposes. Moreover, the Charter does not extend to private
actions. So it is clear, she concludes, that section 2(b) does not give the
right to use private property as a forum for expression.
However, the matter is less clear when public property is involved.
Since the Charter applies to governmental action, the government must
make its property available as a forum for public expression to the extent
required by section 2(b). How far, then, should the section be read as
guaranteeing access to government property for use as a forum for public
expression?
When the right of free expression is viewed in its historical and philosophical context, says McLachlin J., several matters become clear.
First, the government qua proprietor does not have the absolute right to
prohibit and regulate expression on all property it owns. To the contrary,
there is a venerable tradition that some types of state property — such as

17
18

Id., at paras. 7-9.
This account draws on id., at paras. 214-52.
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streets and parks — are proper forums for public expression. Were this
not true, little would remain of the right.
On the other hand, it is clear that section 2(b) does not comprehend
the right to use all government property as an expressive forum, regardless of its function:
There is no historical precedent, whether in England, the United States
or this country, for extending freedom of expression to purely private
areas merely because they happen to be on government-owned
property. Freedom of expression has not traditionally been recognized
to apply to such places or means of communication as internal
government offices, air traffic control towers, publicly-owned
broadcasting facilities, prison cells and judges’ private chambers. To
say that the guarantee of free speech extends to such arenas is to
19
surpass anything the framers of the Charter could have intended.

This conclusion, says McLachlin J., is supported by pragmatic considerations. The state should not be obliged to defend in the courts
restrictions on expression which do not raise the values and interests traditionally associated with the free speech guarantee. Any other view
threatens to trivialize the Charter guarantee. A threshold test is required
to screen out cases that clearly fall beyond the purview of section 2(b),
even before reaching section 1. The threshold should not be so high as to
exclude persons with legitimate claims. Nevertheless, a claimant should
have to make a prima facie case that expression on the public property in
question engages traditional free speech concerns and hence falls within
the ambit of section 2(b).
Justice McLachlin concludes that the protection afforded by section
2(b) lies somewhere between the extremes of absolute government control over expression on state-owned property on the one hand and
protection for all expression on state-owned property on the other. She
acknowledges that the “compatibility with function” test proposed by
Lamer C.J.C. represents such an intermediate approach, but she questions whether it is a useful and appropriate tool for screening out claims.
Doubtless, the compatibility of the property’s purpose with free expression is a factor in determining whether a governmental restriction is
constitutional under section 1. However, it is doubtful whether it is the
only factor. It is also unclear if it properly arises at the initial stage under
section 2(b). Moreover, argues McLachlin J., the concept of function presents difficulties. Does it mean normal function? Minimal or essential
19

Id., at para. 227.
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function? Optimal function? At what point does expression become incompatible with function? Presumably, it is only severe impairments of
function that would render section 2(b) inapplicable, while limitations
relating to optimal (as opposed to minimal) function would fall to be justified under section 1. Yet drawing this line may prove difficult in
practice.
In short, argues McLachlin J., the concept of function proves to be a
relative one. In some cases, the right of free expression might be considered important enough to interfere to some extent with the function of
government property. In others, the impairment of function will be so
great in comparison with the expressive interest as to justify exclusion or
limitation of the expression. The concept of function thus involves a balancing of interests which arguably serves better as part of the section 1
test than as a threshold for screening out claims which raise no prima
facie expressive interest.
So, concludes McLachlin J., the test under section 2(b) should be
primarily definitional rather than one of balancing. Once it has been determined that expression at the location in question falls within the scope
of section 2(b), the analysis moves to section 1 where the court weighs
and balances the conflicting interests — the individual’s interest in using
the forum for expressive purposes against the state’s interest in limiting
expression on the particular property. The problem, then, is one of “defining what types of government property should prima facie be regarded
as constitutionally available for forums for public expression”.20
At this point, the argument takes a surprising turn. Given McLachlin
J.’s characterization of the problem, one would expect her to proceed by
characterizing the kinds of government property that qualify for constitutional protection. Instead, she shifts the focus from government property
as such to governmental restrictions on expression in certain locations.
She refers to the Irwin Toy decision, which, as seen earlier, distinguishes
between two classes of restrictions: (1) those that have the purpose of
preventing certain meanings from being conveyed; and (2) those that are
not aimed at content but have the effect of restricting expression. She
observes that limitations on forums for public expression may fall into
either of these classes. For example, a ban on anti-war messages on Parliament Hill might be viewed as essentially content-based, because it
identifies certain messages that may not be conveyed in that location. On
the other hand, many restrictions on forums for public expression are
20

Id., at para. 240.
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content-neutral. Their purpose is not to single out particular meanings but
rather to avoid the harmful consequences of the conduct in question, such
as by preventing interference with the proper functioning of governmentowned property.
This analysis, argues McLachlin J., supports a two-part test, which
depends on the class into which the restriction falls. If the government’s
purpose is to restrict the content of expression through limiting the forums where it can be made, then this restriction is usually impermissible
and section 2(b) applies. On the other hand, if the restriction is contentneutral, the claimant must prove that it has the effect of restricting freedom of expression. In this case, Irwin Toy requires the claimants to show
that their expressive activity in the location promotes one of the purposes
underlying section 2(b), namely: (1) the seeking and obtaining of truth;
(2) participation in social and political decision-making; and (3) the encouragement of diversity in forms of individual self-fulfilment and
human flourishing. Only if such a purpose can be established is the
claimant entitled to the protection of section 2(b).
The effect, says McLachlin J., is to screen out many potential claims
to the use of government property as a forum for public expression.
While the precise boundaries of these three purposes may be a little uncertain, the central elements of the test are relatively clear and capable of
ready application.
It would be difficult to contend that these purposes are served by
“public” expression in the sanctum of the Prime Minister’s office, an
airport control tower, a prison cell or a judge’s private chambers, to
return to examples where it seems self-evident that the guarantee of
free expression has no place. These are not places of public debate
aimed at promoting either the truth or a better understanding of social
and political issues. Nor is expression in these places related to the
open and welcoming environment essential to maximization of
individual fulfillment and human flourishing.
It is equally clear that the purposes of the guarantee of free
expression are served by permitting expression in other forums and that
s. 2(b) should apply to them. To borrow the language of the American
“public forum” doctrine, the use of places which have by tradition or
designation been dedicated to public expression for purposes of
discussing political or social or artistic issues would clearly seem to be
21
linked to the values underlying the guarantee of free speech.
21

Id., at paras. 249-250.
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What is puzzling about this analysis is its contention that one may
identify the classes of government property that merit section 2(b) protection, not by analyzing the characteristics of such properties, but by
scrutinizing governmental restrictions on their use. For under the latter
approach it seems reasonably clear that expression on a given property
will sometimes qualify for protection and sometimes not, depending on
the purpose and effect of the particular restrictive measure. This seems
true even of places that McLachlin J. identifies as obviously beyond the
scope of section 2(b). For example, where a prison policy prohibits inmates from writing letters complaining of ill-treatment, the policy singles
out certain meanings that are not to be conveyed and hence has the purpose of limiting freedom of expression. So section 2(b) would
presumably apply to prison cells in this context, notwithstanding
McLachlin J.’s claim that a prison cell is a place “where it seems selfevident that the guarantee of free expression has no place”. If the test is
intended to exclude certain governmental locations on a “definitional”
basis, it does not appear to succeed.
In any case, it is doubtful if the test serves an effective screening
function. Even in cases where governmental limits on the use of public
property do not have the purpose of restricting expression, in most cases
they surely have the effect of doing so. Justice McLachlin’s argument on
this point is not very convincing. She treats it as self-evident, for example, that public expression in the Prime Minister’s office would not serve
any of the underlying purposes of section 2(b). But this seems dubious.
What better example of political participation than a private chat with the
Prime Minister? The reason why a claim of expressive access to the
Prime Minister’s office is objectionable does not lie in its purposes
(which may well serve the causes of truth and political participation) but
rather in its impact on the functioning of that office, which requires a
high degree of privacy. This consideration suggests the need for a balancing process akin to that proposed by Lamer C.J.C. — a process which
McLachlin J. has cogently argued belongs under section 1 rather than
section 2(b).
3. Location and Reasonable Limits
This point brings us to the approach espoused by L’Heureux-Dubé
J.22 She argues that expressive activities cannot automatically be
22

The following account draws on id., at paras. 110-148.
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excluded from section 2(b) simply because they take place in locations
not traditionally associated with public expression. Limits on expression
in such locations may well be reasonable, but the government has the
burden of demonstrating this under section 1. Even if a group of demonstrators were to choose the chambers of the Supreme Court of Canada as
a forum for expression, governmental restrictions on their activities
would require justification under section 1 — though L’Heureux-Dubé J.
hastens to add that presumably such justification could be readily furnished.
When calibrating the section 1 barometer, the political quality of the
stifled expression must be weighed against the governmental interests.
Unlike the American system, in which distinct tests are required for various “types” of expression, section 1 is flexible enough to accommodate
all such types, with the result depending on the governmental objectives
and the means selected to advance them. This enables the court to take a
contextual rather than a categorical approach, focusing not only on the
scope of the right but also on the setting in which the expressive claim is
made.
In the case at hand, observes L’Heureux-Dubé J., the government relies heavily on its property interest in the airport, arguing that it has the
same rights as any other owner with respect to its property — rights that
are exclusive. The only qualification arises from the fact that the government often dedicates its property for use by the public, which
consequently has the right to use it for the purposes intended by government.
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé agrees that the section 1 analysis must be
sensitive to the unique relationship between government and its property.
However, if members of the public had no right whatsoever to distribute
leaflets or engage in other expressive activity on government-owned
property except with permission, they would have little opportunity to
exercise their rights. Only those with enough wealth to own land or mass
media would be able to engage in free expression, which would subvert
the basic purposes of section 2(b).
On the other hand, says L’Heureux-Dubé J., the Charter’s framers
did not intend such places as internal government offices, air traffic control towers, prison cells and judges’ chambers to be made available for
leafletting or demonstrations. Evidently freedom of expression under
section 2(b) does not provide a right of access to all property, whether
public or private. Such a wholesale transformation of government property is not necessary to fulfil the Charter’s purposes or to avoid a stifling
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of free expression. The logical compromise is to recognize that some, but
not all, government-owned property is constitutionally open to the public
for expressive activity. Restrictions on expression in certain places will
obviously be harder to defend than in others. A number of criteria help
determine which locations should be considered public, including:
(1) the traditional openness of such property for expressive activity;
(2) whether the public is ordinarily admitted to the property as of right;
(3) the compatibility of the property’s purpose with such expressive activities;
(4) how far the property’s availability for expressive activity will help
achieve the purposes of section 2(b);
(5) the symbolic significance of the property for the message being
communicated; and
(6) the availability of other public arenas in the vicinity for expressive
activities.23
To sum up, L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s opinion presents a cogent argument
for the view that section 1 is the most appropriate forum for dealing with
the issue of location. The view is attractive because it respects the internal architecture of the Charter and allows for a contextual rather than
categorical approach.24 Unfortunately, however, the opinion’s major
point is sometimes obscured by language that could be taken to suggest
that restrictions on expression in certain government-owned locations —
internal government offices, air traffic control towers and the like — may
be justified across the board. Yet it is precisely the advantage of section 1
that it allows for a more fine-grained approach — one that acknowledges
that, no matter what the location, certain restrictions on expression will
not be justifiable, even if many others will.
There is one significant objection to L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach
— voiced especially by McLachlin J. — which should be noted here.
According to the Oakes case,25 once a Charter inquiry moves to section
1, the burden of proof always shifts from the claimant to the government.
It seems counterintuitive, argues McLachlin J., that the government
should have to justify in every case limitations on access to such places
23
24
25

This summary is based on id., at para. 147.
See Cameron, supra, note 7, at 95, 106-108.
Supra, note 12.
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as private governmental offices, judges’ chambers and security zones in
airports. The problem is indeed a real one. However, it may arise less
from L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s approach than from an overly rigid application
of the Oakes formula.

IV. THE AFTERMATH OF COMMONWEALTH
For some years after the Commonwealth decision,26 the Supreme
Court avoided any attempt to resolve the division of opinion in the case.
When the issue of location arose in the Ramsden case27 in 1993, the
Court held that, on the facts, the result was the same no matter which
approach was taken. On any view, a municipal by-law banning posters
on public property infringed freedom of expression in section 2(b) and
could not be justified under section 1.
Thus the matter stood for more than a decade. However, the issue
could not be skirted indefinitely, and in 2005 it came up again in the
Montréal case.28 The claimant was a strip club operating in a commercial
zone of downtown Montreal. To attract customers, the club set up a loudspeaker in its main entrance, which amplified the music and commentary
from the show going on inside. One night, a police officer on patrol
heard the music from a nearby intersection and charged the club with
violating a municipal by-law that prohibited noise produced by sound
equipment “heard from the outside”. In court, the club raised the defence
of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.
The trial judge rejected the argument and convicted the club. The
case went on appeal, eventually reaching the Supreme Court of Canada.
In a judgment written by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and Justice
Marie Deschamps, the Court ruled by a strong majority that the by-law
infringed the claimant’s freedom of expression but that it could be justified as a reasonable limit under section 1.29 As for the question of the bylaw’s application to the location in question — the public streets of
Montreal — the Court concluded that on any of the three approaches
proposed in the Commonwealth case, the emission of noise onto the public street was protected by section 2(b). So it was unnecessary to

26
27
28
29

Commonwealth, supra, note 2.
Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), [1993] S.C.J. No. 87, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 (S.C.C.).
Montréal, supra, note 3.
Justice Ian Binnie dissented.
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determine which approach should be adopted.30 However, in an effort to
clarify the matter, the Court went on to express the following views.
The application of section 2(b) is not attracted by the mere fact of
government ownership of the place. There has to be a further enquiry to
determine if the place represents the type of public property which merits
the section’s protection. Expressive activity should be excluded from the
scope of section 2(b) only if its method or location clearly undermines
the values that support the guarantee. The Court drew a parallel with violent modes of expression, which are not protected because they prevent
dialogue, block the self-fulfilment of the victim and impede the search
for truth.
Following this line of thought, the Court proposes the following test:
The basic question with respect to expression on government-owned
property is whether the place is a public place where one would expect
constitutional protection for free expression on the basis that expression
in that place does not conflict with the purposes which s. 2(b) is
intended to serve, namely (1) democratic discourse, (2) truth finding
and (3) self-fulfillment. To answer this question, the following factors
should be considered:
(a) the historical or actual function of the place; and
(b) whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression
within it would undermine the values underlying free
31
expression.

To some extent, as the Court observes, this test represents a fusion of
several views expressed in the Commonwealth case. Notably, it picks up
McLachlin J.’s reference to the basic values underpinning section 2(b)
and attempts to incorporate these into the test. However in other respects
the test seems more indebted to the approach of Lamer C.J.C. Thus it
adopts his view that the question of location arises at the first stage of the
analytical process, where the court considers the scope of section 2(b),
rather than at the subsequent “infringement” stage, as McLachlin J.
thought, or at the final “justification” stage, as L’Heureux-Dubé J. argued. It also reflects the Chief Justice’s emphasis on the function of the
place, while making it clear that both historical and actual function are
relevant.

30
31

Montréal, supra, note 3, at paras. 60-70.
Id., at para. 74.
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Nevertheless, the test departs from Lamer C.J.C.’s approach in one
fundamental way. It tacitly ignores his call for a “balancing” between the
form of the expression and the function of the place, and so doing, rejects
his view that no place is completely bereft of section 2(b) protection.
Rather it adopts a broadly “categorical” approach, one that focuses on the
character of the place and its general suitability for expression. In effect,
the test aims at determining whether the place itself merits section 2(b)
protection, regardless of the character of the expressive activity carried
on there.
In the Montréal case, the Court offers its viewpoint as an explicit
obiter dictum. Nevertheless, dicta that fall from on high have a way of
slipping into the mainstream of jurisprudence. Such is the case here.
When the question of location arose in the recent Vancouver decision,32
the majority of the Court simply reproduced the Montréal test and applied it. The claimants, a student group and a teachers’ federation,
attempted to purchase advertising space on the sides of buses operated by
public transit authorities in British Columbia.33 The student group sought
to post ads encouraging more young people to vote in a forthcoming provincial election. For its part, the teachers’ federation wished to voice
concerns about changes in the public education system. For years, the
transit authorities had earned revenue by posting advertisements on their
buses. However, they refused the claimants’ ads, invoking written policies that forbade ads expressing political viewpoints. The claimants went
to court, arguing that the policies violated their freedom of expression.
The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that section 2(b) was
not infringed. The claimants appealed and the case found its way to the
Supreme Court of Canada, which ruled by a strong majority that the advertising policies of the transit authorities infringed the claimants’
freedom of expression and could not be justified under section 1.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Marie Deschamps explains that the
Court has long taken a generous and purposive approach to the interpretation of freedom of expression.34 An activity that conveys or attempts to
convey meaning will prima facie be protected by section 2(b). Furthermore, in such cases as Commonwealth, Ramsden and Montréal, the
Court recognized that the section protects the right to express oneself in
certain public places. However, observes Deschamps J., section 2(b) is
32
33
34

Supra, note 4.
This summary is based on id., at paras. 2-7.
The following account draws on id., at paras. 27-28, 36-47.
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not without limits, and governments will not be required to justify every
restriction on expression under section 1. The method or location of the
expressive activity may exclude it from protection. Just as violent expression falls outside the scope of section 2(b), individuals do not have a
constitutional right to express themselves on all government property.
One basic issue, then, is whether the claimants’ proposed expressive activity should be denied section 2(b) protection on the basis of its location
— the sides of public buses.
In dealing with this issue, Deschamps J. adopts the approach taken in
the Montréal case and poses the following questions. First, do the claimants’ proposed advertisements have expressive content that brings them
within the prima facie scope of section 2(b)? Second, if so, does the
method or location of this expression remove that protection? Third, if
the expression is protected by section 2(b), do the transit authorities’
policies infringe the guarantee? Finally, if they do, can they be justified
under section 1?
For Deschamps J., the first question is not problematic, because the
proposed ads clearly have expressive content. The third question is also
uncontroversial, because the transit policies have the explicit purpose of
restricting the content of ads, specifically targeting political speech.
However, the second question, which concerns location, requires closer
attention.
Here Deschamps J. reproduces the Montréal test, focusing on two
main factors:
(1) the historical or actual function of the place; and
(2) whether other aspects of the place suggest that expression within it
would undermine the values underlying free expression.
With respect to the first factor, Deschamps J. observes that the trial
judge found there was no history of political advertising on buses, and
that he considered this fact pivotal in ruling against the claimants. However, comments Deschamps J., content is not relevant to the
determination of the function of a place. This conclusion, we may note,
flows from the “definitional” character of the Montréal test, whereby the
character of the particular expressive activity (to wit, political advertising) does not affect the question whether the place receives protection.
Where the historical or current function of a place includes public
expression, continues Deschamps J., this is a good indication that expression in that place is constitutionally protected. Thus, a podium erected for
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public use in a park would necessarily have a function that does not conflict with the purposes of section 2(b) but rather enhances them.
However, she notes, most cases are not this straightforward, because they
concern places whose primary function is not expression. In such instances it is useful to look at past or present practice, which can help
identify any incidental functions that may have developed.
Justice Deschamps applies this approach in the following passage:
While it is true that buses have not been used as spaces for this type of
expressive activity for as long as city streets, utility poles and town
squares, there is some history of their being so used, and they are in
fact being used for it at present. As a result, not only is there some
history of use of this property as a space for public expression, but
there is actual use — both of which indicate that the expressive activity
in question neither impedes the primary function of the bus as a vehicle
for public transportation nor, more importantly, undermines the values
35
underlying freedom of expression.

We may note that, at the end of this passage, Deschamps J. strays into
a form of “balancing test”, insofar as she considers the impact of the particular expressive activity on the function of the location. As seen earlier,
the Montréal approach apparently frowns on such an exercise, focusing
rather on the characteristics of the place as a venue for expression.
Be that as it may, Deschamps J. now turns to the second factor mentioned in Montréal, namely, whether other aspects of the place suggest
that expression within it would undermine the values underlying section
2(b). She draws attention to the transit authority’s argument that the
buses should be characterized as private publicly owned property, to
which the public cannot reasonably expect access. However, she holds
that this position is untenable. The very fact that members of the public
have access to advertising space on buses indicates that they would expect constitutional protection of their expression in that space. Moreover,
a bus is by nature a public, not a private, space. Unlike activities that take
place in certain government buildings or offices, those that occur on public buses do not require privacy and limited access. Buses operate on city
streets and form an integral part of the public transportation system. People using the streets are exposed to messages on the sides of buses just as
they are to messages on utility poles and other public spaces. Like a city
street, a bus is a public place where individuals can interact with one another and their surroundings. Thus, rather than undermining the purposes
35

Id., at para. 42 (emphasis added).
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of section 2(b), expression on the sides of buses could enhance those
purposes by furthering democratic discourse and perhaps even truthfinding and self-fulfilment.
In sum, concludes Deschamps J., this is not a case in which the Court
must decide whether to protect access to a space where the government
has never before recognized a right to such access. Rather, the question is
whether the side of a bus, as a public place where expressive activity is
already occurring, is a location where constitutional protection for free
expression would be expected. There is no aspect of the location that
suggests that expression within it would undermine the values underlying
free expression — to the contrary. It follows that the side of a bus is a
location where expressive activity is protected by section 2(b).
One might be forgiven, perhaps, for thinking this is much ado about
nothing. The blandness of the Court’s conclusion seems disproportionate
to the lengthy and prolix analysis. And indeed this is a major problem
with the Montréal test. In the end, it is hard to see how location alone
can ever serve to exclude the application of section 2(b) without reference to the character of the expressive activity and the laws restricting it.
Let me explain.

V. ANALYSIS
Three basic approaches to the question of location may be identified.
The first focuses simply on the characteristics of the place in question —
inquiring into such matters as its historical and current functions and its
general suitability for expressive activities. This approach, which is exemplified by the Montréal decision, holds that the inquiry should be
carried out at the first stage of the Irwin Toy process, which concerns itself with the scope of section 2(b).
The second approach broadens the canvas somewhat and considers
both the character of the place and also that of the expressive activity,
balancing one factor against the other. This approach, represented by
Lamer C.J.C.’s opinion in the Commonwealth case, also designates the
first stage of the analytical process as the appropriate venue.
The third approach broadens the canvas still further and considers not
only the place and the expressive activity but also the restrictive law, exploring the interaction among these three factors. This approach, which is
exemplified in different ways by both L’Heureux-Dubé J. and McLachlin
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J. in the Commonwealth case, holds that the matter cannot be settled at the
initial stage but only at a later stage in the analytical process.
I will argue that neither the first nor the second approach stands up to
critical scrutiny and that the third approach is the only truly viable one.
The argument consists of three propositions. For clarity, I set them out
here at the start:
(1) There is no place — public or private — that is categorically excluded from the protective scope of section 2(b); the contrary view
confuses freedom of expression with the right of expressive access.
(2) The question of location is inextricably linked to the character of the
restrictive law, which forms an essential part of the inquiry.
(3) The issue of location cannot be resolved at the initial stage of the
Irwin Toy analysis, but only at a later stage where the Court considers the impugned law — preferably under section 1.
I now explore these points in greater detail.
1. No Places Are Excluded from Section 2(b)
The guarantee of freedom of expression in section 2(b) extends to all
locations within the territorial reach of the Charter. There is no place —
public or private — that is excluded categorically from the protective
scope of the section.
Consider the places that have been cited as paradigmatic examples of
locations not covered by section 2(b). These include privately owned
property, internal government offices, air-traffic control towers, stateowned broadcasting facilities, prison cells, judges’ chambers, the Cabinet
Room and the Prime Minister’s office.36
Of course, it is obvious that individuals do not have the right of free
access to such places in order to express themselves. An aspiring Walpole is not entitled to camp in the Prime Minister’s office in order to
participate in high-level political discussions. And a budding Rumpole
has no right to barge into a judge’s chambers to bend her ear about a
case. But it does not follow that these places are categorically excluded
from the scope of section 2(b). It only shows that certain laws — common law and statutory — that restrict access to such places are justified.
36
Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at paras. 218, 227, 249, per McLachlin J.; Montréal, supra, note 3, at paras. 64, 76, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Deschamps J.
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A few examples may help clarify the point. No one can doubt the
wisdom of regulations that limit public access to air-traffic control towers. But this does not mean that these towers fall into an expressive “dead
zone” beyond section 2(b)’s reach. Think of a law that requires air-traffic
controllers to communicate exclusively in English when on the job.
There seems little doubt that such a law would infringe the controllers’
freedom of expression and require justification under section 1. As the
Supreme Court held in the Ford case,37 language is so intimately related
to the form and content of expression that there cannot be true freedom
of expression if one is prohibited from using the language of one’s
choice. The fact that the law relates specifically to air-traffic control towers, which are off-limits to the general public, does not insulate it from
scrutiny under section 2(b). The same would hold true of laws governing
the language employed by broadcasters in state-run television facilities,
to say nothing of the language used in judges’ chambers.
Take another example. We all know that many governmental activities require privacy and that the general public cannot reasonably claim
unrestricted access to essentially “private” governmental offices for expressive purposes. However, it does not follow that such offices fall
outside section 2(b)’s scope. Consider the following scenario. A public
servant gives a reporter a confidential government document relating to
the torture of Afghan detainees. She does this behind closed doors, in a
government office not open to the general public. She is prosecuted for
wrongful communication of a secret document contrary to the Security of
Information Act.38 In her defence, she claims the protection of section
2(b). It seems clear that her case passes the threshold for Charter protection, even though the expressive act took place in a private governmental
office. The result would be no different if it occurred in the public servant’s own living room or for that matter a prison cell. The real question
is whether the restrictive law is reasonable and justified — a matter eminently suited for consideration under section 1.
There is no need, perhaps, to multiply examples. But a final one may
cap the point. High-school classrooms are not locations to which the
general public can claim free access for expressive purposes. Considerations of security, privacy and order dictate the need for strict restrictions
on who may enter such places. This does not mean, however, that section
37
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at para.
40 (S.C.C).
38
R.S.C. 1985, c. O-5, s. 4(1).
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2(b) fails to protect expression in classrooms, which indeed are nurseries
of free inquiry. The point is illustrated by the Keegstra case,39 where a
high-school teacher was charged with the criminal offence of wilful promotion of hatred40 for communicating anti-Semitic statements to his
students in the course of his classes. The teacher argued that the Criminal
Code provision unjustifiably infringed his freedom of expression under
the Charter. The Supreme Court held unanimously that the teacher was
entitled to invoke the protection of section 2(b), but went on to rule by a
majority that the Criminal Code provision represented a reasonable limit
under section 1. The fact that the teacher’s expressive activities took
place in a school classroom — a location closed to the general public —
was tacitly regarded as posing no obstacle to the application of section
2(b).
As these examples show, the Montréal case is wrong to suggest that a
location may fall outside the scope of section 2(b) simply because of its
inherent characteristics. There are no expressive dead zones. Even quintessentially private places stand to benefit in certain contexts from the
guarantee of freedom of expression. It does not, of course, follow that section 2(b) overturns all laws restricting expressive access to such places.
That is a different matter — one properly addressed under section 1.
2. Location Is Linked to the Restrictive Law
The question of location is relevant to freedom of expression only
where a restrictive law makes it so. As such, location cannot be considered in isolation from the law that renders it significant.
Consider this example. A “sit-in” occurs in the principal’s office of
an Ontario public school. One of the protesters, Amanda, is charged with
trespass contrary to section 2(1) of the Trespass to Property Act.41 Another protester, Bakari, is charged with the criminal offence of
defamatory libel42 for statements written on a placard he is carrying.
Both protesters claim the protection of section 2(b). The location of the
expressive activity is legally significant in Amanda’s case, because the
offence of trespass is linked essentially to the place where the expressive
39

R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Keeg-

stra”].
40

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 319(2).
R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21. Under s. 1(2), the Act applies to school sites.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. For discussion, see R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No.
28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 (S.C.C.).
41
42
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activity occurs. Thus, the Crown will likely argue that Amanda’s freedom
of expression does not give her the right to enter the principal’s office to
voice her views. But location does not arise as an issue in Bakari’s case,
because the Criminal Code provision under which he is charged prohibits
the publication of a libel generally – not just in certain places.43 Thus, the
question whether Bakari has the right to be in the office is irrelevant to
the argument, which focuses on the elements of the impugned law. In
sum, the issue of location is a live one in Amanda’s case but not in
Bakari’s. The difference stems from the laws under which they are
charged.
This point is overlooked in both the “definitional” approach taken in
Montréal and the “balancing” approach of Lamer C.J.C. in Commonwealth. Both maintain that the question of location may be disposed of at
the first stage of the Irwin Toy analysis, with no reference to the impugned law. Consider, for example, this passage from the Chief Justice’s
opinion in Commonwealth:
In my view, if the expression takes a form that contravenes or is
inconsistent with the function of the place where the attempt to
communicate is made, such a form of expression must be considered to
fall outside the sphere of s. 2(b). For example, if a person tried to picket
in the middle of a busy highway or to set up barricades on a bridge, it
might well be concluded that such a form of expression in such a place
is incompatible with the principal function of the place, which is to
provide for the smooth flow of automobile traffic. In such a case, it
could not be concluded that freedom of expression had been restricted
if a government representative obliged the picketer to express himself
44
elsewhere.

What is invisible here is the law that actually governs the situation.
In reading this passage, of course, we silently supply the statutory and
common law rules that restrict the ability of individuals to obstruct
highways and bridges. Indeed Lamer C.J.C. tacitly refers to such laws in
the final sentence, where he speaks of a government official obliging
picketers to remove themselves. But the powers of officials flow entirely
from the law — which the Chief Justice fails to specify. Without considering the scope and tenor of the restrictive law, how can we determine
whether the picketer’s claim succeeds or fails? No doubt, certain laws
43
This might not be the case were Bakari charged under s. 299(a), which requires that the
libel be exhibited “in public”. However, the charge is laid under s. 299(b), which only requires that
the libel be caused “to be read or seen”.
44
Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at para. 21.
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that prevent individuals from engaging in expressive activities on highways represent reasonable limits on freedom of expression. But it does
not follow that such laws are immune to constitutional scrutiny simply
because of the location and character of the expressive conduct. The
question of location is inextricably linked to the nature of the law in
question — a matter best assessed under section 1.
The point is reinforced by the Library of Parliament example discussed in Lamer C.J.C.’s judgment. The Chief Justice speaks there as if
the question may be settled simply by determining whether the form of
the expressive activity is compatible with the principal function of the
library — shouting a political slogan, he intimates, is not compatible,
while wearing a T-shirt with a slogan may well be. But the matter cannot
be resolved so simply. We need to know something about the law that
actually governs the case — the rules and regulations of the library, as
underpinned by the law of property.
Suppose a teenager on a school tour is ejected from the Library of
Parliament for wearing a skimpy muscle shirt with the slogan “Politicians suck”. He goes to court claiming that his freedom of expression has
been violated. The government argues that the case falls outside the
scope of section 2(b) because the Library of Parliament is not a location
to which the general public has a general right of access. Under Lamer
C.J.C.’s approach, the court should decide the question by asking
whether the teenager’s conduct is compatible with the principal function
of the place. But we cannot know which aspect of the claimant’s conduct
is relevant without knowing the salient rule.
Imagine two different rules, each serving as a possible basis for the
teenager’s expulsion:
1. “Threatening, abusive, discriminatory or harassing language or
conduct of any kind is not allowed.”
2. “Members of the public must wear shirts and shoes and other
45
appropriate attire.”

The constitutional argument takes a different form depending on
the rule. With the first rule, under Lamer C.J.C.’s test, the question is
whether “abusive” language — the crude slogan — is compatible with
the function of the library. In the second case, the question is whether
the wearing of “inappropriate” attire — the skimpy muscle shirt — is
45
Both rules are found in the Rules of Conduct of the Toronto Public Library, reproduced
on the website, online: <http://www.torontopubliclibrary.ca/abo_pol_rules_of_conduct.jsp>.
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compatible. We cannot know which question is correct unless we know
which rule is being applied. The test can only be carried out by tacitly
“smuggling” the law into the inquiry.
In short, the restrictive law that gives rise to a claim under section
2(b) is an essential part of the inquiry when the question of location is
raised. Any approach that purports to resolve the matter without taking
the law into account seems misguided. This holds true as much for the
Montréal approach as it does for that of Lamer C.J.C.; neither approach
permits reference to the impugned law in dealing with issues of location.
It could be argued that, in reality, these two approaches are mainly
concerned with rights of expressive access rather than freedom of expression more generally. That is, they are directed at cases where a person
seeks to use section 2(b) to gain entry for expressive purposes to a place
to which, under the general law, the public has limited or no right of access. This focus, it is argued, explains the character of the tests advanced
and goes a long way to making sense of them. So long as the tests are
confined to this context they may serve a useful purpose.
There can be little doubt that certain judges had the right of expressive access primarily in mind when they crafted their approaches to the
question of location. But even if we limit their remarks to this context, it
does not extricate them from the difficulties already noted. The reason is
simple. When individuals claim the right of expressive access to a location from which they are generally barred, their claim necessarily calls
into question certain aspects of the law which restricts their access. As
such that law forms a vital part of the inquiry.46
3. The Question of Location Is Best Considered under Section 1
If the question of location does not properly arise at the first stage of
the inquiry, it must obviously be considered at a later stage, where the
46
Recall that restrictive laws are not confined to “written laws”, such as statutory provisions, regulations or by-laws. They also take the form of common law rules — especially rules
governing property, private and public. Although the Charter does not apply to the common law
governing relations between private parties, it does apply to common law rules governing the actions
of governmental parties. See R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 573, at paras. 25-39, esp. para. 34 (S.C.C.). Moreover, the phrase “prescribed by law” in s. 1
of the Charter has been held to include the common law: R. v. Thomsen, [1988] S.C.J. No. 31, [1988]
1 S.C.R. 640, at para. 15 (S.C.C.), citing R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, at
645 (S.C.C.). The point was approved in Commonwealth, supra, note 2, at paras. 157-158, per
L’Heureux-Dubé J., and at paras. 261-262, per McLachlin J., and was reiterated in Vancouver, supra, note 4, at para. 52.
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court turns its attention to the impugned law — that is, either at the second stage (dealing with the question of infringement) or at the third stage
(dealing with the question of justification under section 1). As between
the two, the final stage under section 1 offers the more suitable venue
because it allows a court to canvass the full range of considerations arising in the concrete context of the case.
The second stage, where a court considers whether the law infringes
freedom of expression, offers only limited opportunities for such a review. Indeed as we saw earlier, under the criteria set out in Irwin Toy, it
must be a rare day when an impugned law is not found to infringe freedom of expression — at least in effect if not in purpose. One could, of
course, revamp these criteria in order to allow a court to consider a fuller
range of factors in a more critical light. However, such an exercise would
involve a major departure from the Irwin Toy framework, with implications extending far beyond the current subject.
It follows that questions pertaining to location are best determined at
the final stage under section 1, where the court assesses whether the impugned law constitutes a reasonable limit on the right. Here it is worth
recalling the comments of Dickson C.J.C. in the Keegstra case,47 where
he discusses the merits of section 1:
... I agree with the general approach of Wilson J. in Edmonton Journal
... where she speaks of the danger of balancing competing values
without the benefit of a context. This approach does not logically
preclude the presence of balancing within s. 2(b) — one could avoid
the dangers of an overly abstract analysis simply by making sure that
the circumstances surrounding both the use of the freedom and the
legislative limit were carefully considered. I believe, however, that s. 1
of the Charter is especially well suited to the task of balancing, and
consider this Court’s previous freedom of expression decisions to
support this belief. It is, in my opinion, inappropriate to attenuate the s.
2(b) freedom on the grounds that a particular context requires such; the
large and liberal interpretation given the freedom of expression in Irwin
Toy indicates that the preferable course is to weigh the various
48
contextual values and factors in s. 1.

47
48

Supra, note 39.
Id., at para. 40.
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The point could hardly be put better. I might only add that, in deciding
such questions under section 1, courts will have the opportunity to develop a flexible body of criteria that adapts the traditional Oakes49 test
to the specific context of location. In so doing they may wish to reconsider the question of where the burden of proof appropriately lies in this
context.
Such a process will inevitably carry courts further down the road
away from the simplistic premise that section 1 imports a monolithic
standard applying to all Charter guarantees in the same way. This
would be a welcome development. Different Charter rights require
somewhat different forms and standards of justification, ones that are
tailored to the particular rights in question and in effect form part of
their basic structures.50

49

Supra, note 12.
The general point is argued in Brian Slattery, “The Pluralism of the Charter: Revisiting
the Oakes test”, in Luc Tremblay & Grégoire Webber, The Limitation of Charter Rights: Critical
Essays on R. v. Oakes (Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 2009), at 13-35. As Jamie Cameron says: “Over
time, each of the guarantees will be read as though s. 1 is appended to it, in order to enable justificatory criteria which is responsible to each, to evolve” (supra, note 7, at 118, note 100).
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